

1 contamination. But most cold-pack cheeses won't support
2 the growth of Listeria to high levels. And even though
3 there may have been recalls of those products, it really
4 speaks to whether, indeed, those products represent a
5 present, imminent danger to public health.

6 So, I think it is very critical that we have
7 some kind of measure on whether these products can
8 support growth. And I think Bruce's point is well-taken.
9 I think there are industry folks that can help out in
10 that assessment.

11 And Bob Buchanan talked about the role of
12 challenge studies, inoculated pack studies. And there's
13 plenty of those as well that can be factored in on that
14 particular point.

15 So, to me, it goes just beyond probability of
16 contamination, you know, whether it's contaminated there
17 or not. But it's also level of contamination at the time
18 of consumption, I think. I know that's a difficult thing
19 to model.

20 The other thing, the other piece I guess I
21 would ask about is the quantitative data. I know the UK
22 data that Dr. Hitchins presented had as a upper limit
23 greater than a thousand per gram, I believe. And given
24 the scientific nature of the risk assessment that we're

1 trying to do, given the work at the University of Georgia
2 and the Emory Primate Center on the L.M. Monkey Study, as
3 I call it, trying to get at infective dose, my question
4 is that we try and measure up the levels of Listeria in
5 these products that we're consuming versus anything that
6 would come out at infective dose study, is greater than a
7 thousand per gram or a thousand per gram sufficient
8 enough? Or should we be trying to go higher in terms of
9 quantitating levels?

10 And then, I guess my other question is the
11 issue of, really, how do we harmonize ready-to-eat foods,
12 definitions of ready-to-eat foods in this whole process
13 versus, say, frozen foods, for example? And how do we
14 factor that in as well? Thank you.

15 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Thanks, Paul. Other
16 comments from -- Okay. Tony?

17 DR. TONY HITCHINS: Tony Hitchins, FDA. Just a
18 comment on Paul's comments. There are data in the
19 collection already that have, you know, numbers greater
20 than a thousand per gram. It's just that in that
21 particular study or that piece of that study, it wasn't
22 apparent; it wasn't done.

23 MR. MORRIS POTTER: You got a little far from
24 the mike there, Tony.

1 DR. TONY HITCHINS: Sorry. There is data in
2 the data base, at least from some other studies, that
3 gives numbers for rare cases where the counts are greater
4 than a thousand per gram. And not all studies have that,
5 but some do. Yeah.

6 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Wally?

7 MR. WALLY SCHLECH: Wally Schlech again. I
8 just wanted to comment about the quantitation. I think
9 that you also, particularly if you're looking at levels
10 of quantitation, need to look again at the host. There
11 is clear data in the Boston outbreak in the late 70's
12 that antacids were a risk factor. So, you may decide to,
13 say, allow ten to the two Listeria per gram to get out
14 into the market. But that may not be sufficient to
15 protect one of these immunocompromised individuals. And
16 if you look at all the Pepcid AC ads on TV, it seems like
17 the entire American population is swallowing them. Then
18 maybe that would argue against -- and presumably the
19 monkey studies might give some additional information.
20 But we certainly have studies in a gastric model in rats
21 that is a real phenomenon.

22 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Thanks, Wally. The BRFSS
23 surveys have looked at antacid and H2 blocker
24 consumption, at least in some of them, so there are some

1 data there. But that may be a bit difficult to model.

2 MS. CARY FRYE: Cary Frye, International Dairy
3 Foods Association. Also, the National Cheese Institute.
4 And we really appreciate the comments here today, and
5 we're very supportive of the risk assessment. I did
6 speak to Mary Bender about some of the data she presented
7 with the food consumption, specifically in the cheese
8 category. And the slide that you showed about mandatory
9 pasteurization of 33 percent is certainly accurate. I
10 don't disagree with that.

11 However, I think commercial practices of cheese
12 manufacturing, specifically cheese manufacturing that
13 could have a higher probability of contamination, are
14 showing that pasteurized milk is used. I know
15 commercially, Mexican-style cheese by one of our members,
16 all of their milk is pasteurized. So, it appears there
17 could be a data gap here that might need additional
18 information that we could assist with, rather than just
19 looking at the regulations, but maybe providing actual
20 practices for cheese manufacture. So, I realize that,
21 and we hope that we can provide that because many soft
22 cheeses are made with pasteurized milk for that very
23 reason.

24 Secondly, I had a question related to the risk

1 assessment similar to this same line of thinking. If you
2 look at the literature, you're looking at it worldwide,
3 cheeses that may show levels of Listeria that were made
4 from raw milk because there's different regulations in
5 different countries. And how will you account for that
6 in the risk assessment? Will there be any accounting for
7 the different practices of how cheeses are produced?
8 Because it's my understanding the risk assessment will be
9 looking at the risk of the U.S. population. Will you
10 look at the imported cheeses such as the data we have at
11 NCI and weight that, or will you look at all cheeses?
12 Thank you.

13 DR. MARY BENDER: Mary Bender, FDA. There's
14 somebody back there right now who's trying to get data,
15 as you're discussing. Our Regulatory Affairs Office at
16 FDA does collect some data on imports. And they're
17 really excited that they have a data base going, but
18 they've warned us not to take everything as is because
19 this is a developing data base. But we have been able to
20 look at some of the imports of the lots of cheeses. And
21 a certain proportion that's been tested or held back for
22 Listeria, and then some where there have been positive
23 results. But it's been a challenge to try to put this
24 all together to come out with something that makes sense

1 and is accurate. There was one slide that I had that --
2 we do want to look at this further to try to figure out.
3 And I really do appreciate any help.

4 Now, Cary and two others did come to me at the
5 break and said that there really has not been an outbreak
6 related to ice cream. And I looked back at my file, and
7 there was an epidemiological link -- I don't know -- it
8 was from a CDC article. And you all are the experts.
9 This is something I've read. So, I really appreciate the
10 input. Thanks.

11 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Other comments? Yes.

12 MR. LARRY BORCHERT: Larry Borchert with the
13 American Meat Institute. My comments also deal with data
14 acquisition and consideration. And it really is
15 following up on points that have already been made. And
16 I'll use that as an example. A hot dog is not a hot dog
17 is not a hot dog as a cheese is. If we are considering
18 international data, for example, the hot dogs that are
19 made in Germany, for example, have probably twice the
20 brine concentration, traces of salt and water
21 concentration, that they do in this country. So, it
22 warrants us to be very careful of the use of
23 international data.

24 Likewise, acquisition of data, I think we do

1 need to be cognizant of sales data. For example, two
2 major companies in the United States produce 40 percent
3 of the hot dogs in the United States. So, looking at
4 broad-based consumption data might distort the overall
5 picture, particularly if one or both of these companies
6 are using some intervention technique that might decrease
7 the prevalence of Listeria in their products.

8 So, I think the point I'm trying to make is
9 that we must be very, very careful in acquiring the data
10 and using the data that we are applying that to the
11 specific products that we're talking about, not just a
12 generic family of those particular products. Thank you.

13 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Thanks, Larry. Other
14 comments? Seeing none, the schedule calls for us to be
15 back in session at 1:00. Since we're a little ahead of
16 schedule, I hope folks will be prompt. We will start
17 again at 1:00. Be here.

18 (Whereupon, a lunch recess was had in
19 this matter.)

20 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Welcome back, everybody.
21 I hope everyone had a nice lunch. We're going to get
22 started. We have two more presentations this afternoon--
23 three more, with the summary. I'm just waiting for a
24 slide. Here we go.

1 As I mentioned, we're going to have two more
2 presentations. Then Dr. Whiting later will do a summary
3 of what has been presented to this day. We're in the
4 session of Hazard Assessment. And the two presenters
5 will be Dr. Pat McCarthy looking at some epidemiologic
6 records. And the second speaker will be Dr. Richard
7 Raybourne on dose-response experimentation.

8 Let me introduce our first speaker, Dr. Pat
9 McCarthy. And he will be speaking on epidemiology of
10 *Listeria monocytogenes* outbreaks.

11 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: Good afternoon. I'm
12 going to talk about the epidemiology of Listeriosis.

13 Next slide, please. *Listeria* was first
14 described in 1926. And a few years later, the organism
15 was recognized as a human pathogen. The suggestion that
16 *Listeria*, Listeriosis could be transmitted to humans in
17 food dates back to the 1930's. But it was not until the
18 1980's that evidence was obtained that Listeriosis is a
19 foodborne disease.

20 Since the 1980's, foodborne outbreaks in
21 sporadic cases have been reported in many countries
22 throughout the world. And in 1986, the Council of State
23 and Territorial Epidemiologists recommended that
24 Listeriosis be a reportable disease.

1 Next slide. Listeria is the name of a group of
2 disorders caused by Listeria. Listeriosis is the name of
3 a group of disorders caused by the organism, Listeria
4 monocytogenes. Listeriosis is clinically defined when
5 Listeria is isolated from blood cultures, spinal fluid or
6 an otherwise normally-sterile site like a placenta or a
7 fetus.

8 Cases of Listeriosis are usually divided into
9 perinatal and nonperinatal groups. The perinatal group
10 includes pregnant women and their fetus or newborn.
11 Women may get Listeriosis at any time during pregnancy,
12 but most cases are reported in the third trimester.

13 Often, pregnant women will present with an
14 influenza-like illness which includes fever, chills and
15 headache. This prodromal illness occurs in about two-
16 thirds of women with pregnancy-associated Listeriosis.
17 About three to seven days after the onset of prodromal
18 symptoms, women will abort the fetus or will have
19 premature labor.

20 In the first trimester, Listeriosis results in
21 spontaneous abortions. In later stages of pregnancy, the
22 result can be a stillbirth or a critically-ill newborn.
23 Sepsis occurs in about 30 percent of pregnant women with
24 Listeriosis, and there are a few reports of meningitis in

1 pregnant women. The fetus can suffer abortion,
2 stillbirth. And the newborn can present with sepsis,
3 meningitis or can die.

4 The nonperinatal group includes all non-
5 pregnant persons over the age of 28 days. Nonperinatal
6 cases primarily include persons that are taking
7 immunosuppressive medications, persons with chronic
8 debilitating diseases like cancer, diabetes or
9 alcoholism, and persons over the age of 60. Healthy
10 children and adults have a relatively low risk of
11 infection from Listeria.

12 When infection does occur in children and
13 adults, Listeriosis is usually superimposed upon some
14 other illness. Nonperinatal cases often present with
15 meningitis or sepsis.

16 In the next few minutes, I'll discuss the early
17 foodborne outbreaks and surveillance for Listeriosis; and
18 I'll provide some examples of recent outbreaks and
19 sporadic reports.

20 Listeriosis is known to cause severe illness,
21 but there have been events in which the majority of cases
22 developed mild symptoms. I'll identify a few events
23 where mild symptoms were primarily reported.

24 I have a slide on the incubation period for

1 Listeriosis and another slide on fecal carriage studies.
2 I'll show you the incident trend for Listeriosis in the
3 United States between 1989 and 1993. And I have some
4 recent data from FoodNet, the ongoing active surveillance
5 program for foodborne diseases.

6 Next slide. The earliest evidence that
7 Listeriosis is a foodborne illness was obtained from
8 outbreaks that occurred in Nova Scotia, Massachusetts,
9 Los Angeles, and Switzerland between 1981 and 1987.
10 Other outbreaks occurred before 1981, but the vehicle of
11 infection was not identified. These outbreaks during the
12 80's lasted for several months each but involved
13 relatively few cases. On the other hand, there were
14 several deaths associated with these outbreaks.

15 Next slide. Both nonperinatal and perinatal
16 cases were identified in each outbreak. The age range
17 for the nonperinatal cases was between age 21 and 100.
18 The median age in the nonperinatal cases was about 60
19 years. In these outbreaks, the majority of the
20 nonperinatal cases were taking immunosuppressive
21 medications, had a debilitating disease or were over age
22 60. About one-third of the nonperinatal cases died.

23 In the perinatal group, the mother and fetus or
24 newborn was considered as a single case. The fatality

1 rate in the perinatal group was about one-third.

2 Matched case-control studies implicated a
3 particular food in each outbreak. In Nova Scotia,
4 coleslaw was implicated. And dairy products were
5 implicated in the other outbreaks. The odds ratios that
6 implicated the food were all significant at the 0.05
7 level or below the 0.05 level. *Listeria monocytogenes* 4b
8 was isolated from cases in each of the outbreaks and from
9 the implicated food in all outbreaks except from
10 Massachusetts.

11 The incident rates that I show here are for the
12 populations in which the outbreaks occurred. I don't
13 have the background incident rates for all these
14 outbreaks. But in Switzerland in the years preceding the
15 outbreak, the background rate was approximately .5 per
16 hundred thousand cases. At the end of the outbreak, the
17 incident rate was about 5 cases per 100,000. Low-
18 incident rates make the outbreaks very difficult to
19 detect. These outbreaks were only detected because all
20 the cases occurred in a single hospital or were reported
21 to a single laboratory. For example, in Los Angeles, a
22 hospital infectious control nurse noticed the increase in
23 cases; and her observation led to the investigation which
24 implicated the Mexican-style cheese.

1 The likely source of Listeria in the Nova
2 Scotia outbreak was the raw manure used to fertilize the
3 cabbage which was made into coleslaw. The sources for
4 all these outbreaks suggest that Listeriosis was linked
5 to the farm or to food production facilities.

6 These early outbreaks showed that Listeriosis,
7 the foodborne Listeriosis can cause abortion, stillbirth,
8 sepsis, meningitis and death. Matched case-control
9 investigations showed that significantly more cases than
10 controls ate the implicated food. The L. monocytogenes
11 4b was identified in most of the infections occurring
12 during the epidemic period. And the epidemic strain of
13 Listeria monocytogenes was isolated from opened and
14 unopened samples of food implicated in 3 of the 4
15 outbreaks.

16 Following the Los Angeles outbreak in 1985, CDC
17 started Listeria surveillance. I show here data from two
18 surveillance populations, but there were other reports in
19 the literature of surveillance that took place between
20 1985 and 1993. There were 34 million people in the 1986
21 surveillance. And between 1989 and 1993, in that
22 surveillance, there was 19 million people. Both
23 surveillance periods included people from Oklahoma,
24 Tennessee and Los Angeles County. The 1986 surveillance

1 population was larger because health departments in
2 Missouri, New Jersey and Washington were included.

3 Before the surveillance was started, hospitals,
4 laboratories and physicians in the surveillance area were
5 contacted and asked to report cases of Listeriosis. At
6 the end of the surveillance period, facilities that
7 reported cases were audited to determine the sensitivity
8 of the surveillance. The case ascertainment for the 1986
9 surveillance was 93 percent, and case ascertainment in
10 1993 was shown to be 97 percent.

11 246 cases were reported in 1986. And between
12 1989 and 1993, about 400 cases were reported. Now, I'm
13 going to show additional data from the 1986 surveillance.
14 And in a few minutes, I'm going to show the incident
15 trend that was developed for Listeriosis between 1989 and
16 1993.

17 Overall, in 1986 there were .7 culture positive
18 cases of Listeriosis per 100,000 population. The rate
19 was slightly less in the nonperinatal group but was much
20 higher, 7.8, in the perinatal group.

21 If Los Angeles County was included, the cases
22 per 100,000 would be approximately 24. But Los Angeles
23 County experienced an outbreak during 1985, and this
24 heightened awareness could have been the reason for the

1 increase in cases. So, I have excluded it in what I'm
2 reporting to you.

3 Listeria monocytogenes has 13 serobars. But 3
4 serotypes accounted for approximately 96 percent of the
5 cases. 1/2a accounted for 30 percent; 1/2b for 33
6 percent; and 4b accounted for 33 percent of the isolates
7 during the 1986 surveillance. Based on surveillance
8 data, it was projected that about 1700 cases and 450
9 deaths due to Listeriosis occurred in the United States
10 in 1986.

11 Next slide. Listeria monocytogenes can cause
12 illness if it penetrates the lining of the GI tract.
13 Once the organism penetrates the tissue, it can protect
14 itself from phagocytosis, grow and then migrate
15 throughout the host. The chance of tissue invasion is
16 thought to depend upon the number of organisms consumed,
17 host susceptibility and virulence of the organism.

18 In the 1986 surveillance, there were 179
19 nonperinatal cases. There was a 2-month-old and a 3-
20 year-old, but the other 177 cases were all age 16 or
21 over. 56 percent of the cases occurred in males; 66
22 percent of the cases had sepsis; 19 had sepsis and
23 meningitis; and 12 percent had meningitis only. About 3
24 percent of the cases had a focal infection caused by

1 Listeria. The incidence of Listeriosis increased with
2 age. 84 percent of the cases were over age 50, and 40
3 percent of the cases were over age 70. In adults,
4 fatalities also increased with age. Overall, there was a
5 35 percent fatality rate. In cases over age 60, the
6 fatality rate was 41 percent.

7 There were 67 affected pregnancies. 80 percent
8 of the pregnancies resulted in live birth, and one of the
9 neonates died. Of the live births, 75 percent were
10 culture positive, so transmission of Listeria to the
11 fetus does not always occur. 80 percent of the culture
12 positive babies had an early onset Listeriosis.

13 Early onset is defined as a case of Listeriosis
14 in a neonate between birth and seven days of age. Early
15 onset is often characterized by a premature birth,
16 respiratory distress and circulatory failure. In 1986,
17 80 percent of the early onset neonates had sepsis, and 20
18 percent had meningitis.

19 20 percent of the culture positive babies had
20 late onset Listeriosis. Late onset is defined as
21 Listeriosis in a neonate between 8 days and 28 days of
22 life. Usually late onset neonates are born healthy and
23 at fullterm. Meningitis is more common in the late onset
24 babies. The mothers of late onset babies usually had an

1 unaffected pregnancy and no prodromal illness. Listeria
2 is rarely isolated from the mother, and the source of
3 Listeriosis is often not identified in late onset cases.

4 Data was available for 31 maternal cases in the
5 1986 surveillance. 58 percent of the mothers experienced
6 premature labor or premature membrane rupture; 32 percent
7 of the mothers had sepsis or fever; and 10 percent
8 aborted their fetus. There was no meningitis and no
9 deaths reported in the maternal cases. Listeriosis is
10 rarely life-threatening to the mother. Other studies in
11 the literature suggest that Listeria does not cause
12 repeated abortions in the same women.

13 Next slide. This slide shows a few examples of
14 outbreaks and sporadic reports of Listeriosis that have
15 occurred since 1988. Listeriosis has been reported in
16 several countries, and a variety of foods have been
17 implicated as the vehicle of infection, including turkey
18 franks, cheese, mushrooms, pate, fish and hot dogs.

19 This slide shows some of the milder symptoms
20 that have been associated with Listeria infection. It's
21 been estimated that 33 percent of all cases give mild
22 symptoms and that most cases occur sporadically. Mild
23 symptoms include chills, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting,
24 fatigue, abdominal cramps. Reports of mild symptoms

1 suggest the possibility that many illnesses caused by
2 Listeria may go unreported.

3 This slide shows events where most of the cases
4 reported mild symptoms -- not all the cases, but most of
5 the cases. Again, mild symptoms associated with Listeria
6 infection have been reported in several countries, and a
7 variety of foods have been implicated as the vehicle of
8 infection.

9 I'd just like to speak a little bit about the
10 cases in Denmark. These cases involved babies at a
11 daycare center. There was a 2-year-old that got fever
12 and was hospitalized. After the fever subsided, he got
13 diarrhea. Blood and stool cultures were obtained. The
14 child was treated for his symptoms and released after two
15 days in good clinical condition. After discharge, blood
16 cultures grew Listeria monocytogenes. The baby was
17 readmitted but no longer had symptoms. Two other babies
18 that attended the same daycare were also admitted to the
19 hospital, released in good condition and then readmitted
20 when the blood culture came back positive. After the
21 second admission, blood cultures from all three babies
22 were negative, but stool cultures grew Listeria
23 monocytogenes 4b. The source of the outbreak was not
24 established. But this example shows that mild symptoms

1 can occur even if a blood culture is positive.

2 The peer reviewed literature shows that the
3 incubation period associated with Listeria infection can
4 range from less than 24 hours to approximately 3 months.
5 Incubation associated with severe illness, like sepsis
6 and meningitis, can range between several days to a few
7 months. The incubation period associated with
8 gastrointestinal symptoms can range between several hours
9 and a few days.

10 The large bowel is the principal reservoir for
11 Listeria in humans. Several studies have looked at fecal
12 carriage to gain insight into how the disease is
13 transmitted, especially in sporadic cases. I show here
14 two examples of fecal carriage studies.

15 In Germany, less than 1 percent of persons with
16 diarrhea and healthy food workers were fecal carriers.
17 In Scotland, approximately 2 percent of pregnant women
18 and 3 percent of nonpregnant women were fecal carriers.
19 In the literature, estimates of fecal carriage ranges
20 between less than 1 percent to 21 percent.

21 It's not known how fecal carriage relates to
22 the length of incubation or to the occurrence of
23 Listeriosis, although it's been suggested that in fecal
24 carriers, stress can undermine resistance; and then

1 carriers can get the disease.

2 This is the Listeriosis incident trend from the
3 1989 to 1993 surveillance. The bar chart shows cases per
4 million on the y-axis and year on the x-axis. About
5 1990, as more information became available, the
6 regulatory agencies and private industry developed plans
7 to reduce the incidence of Listeriosis.

8 Industry initiated HACCP programs and increased
9 sanitation to eliminate contamination. The regulatory
10 agencies expanded programs to remove contaminated foods
11 before retail sale. There was also a consumer education
12 campaign that focused on food safety.

13 Shortly after these efforts were initiated,
14 Listeriosis declined from about 7.9 cases per million in
15 1989 to about 4.4 cases per million in 1993. The decline
16 occurred in diverse geographic areas of the United
17 States. And also, about the same time, Listeriosis
18 declined in the United Kingdom after the government
19 issued a health warning.

20 This data is from FoodNet. FoodNet is an
21 active surveillance program. The purpose of FoodNet is
22 to determine the frequency and severity of foodborne
23 illness. To identify all cases of confirmed disease,
24 FoodNet personnel contact each clinical laboratory in

1 each surveillance area in each catchment area, either
2 weekly or monthly.

3 This slide shows Listeriosis compared to other
4 pathogens that are tracked by FoodNet. There were
5 approximately .5 cases per 100,000 population in 1998.
6 Data for 1996 and 1997 also showed that there was
7 approximately .5 cases per 100,000 population in those
8 years.

9 This chart shows FoodNet data from 1997. The
10 y-axis shows cases per 100,000, and the x-axis shows ages
11 in years. From this graph, you can see that most cases
12 occur in the very young and in the very old. When this
13 same data was broken down by sex, the ratio of males to
14 females was approximately equal. This is approximately
15 the same picture that you would see from the 1986
16 surveillance.

17 A seasonal trend of Listeriosis has been
18 referred to in literature for many years. This slide
19 shows combined FoodNet data from 1986 and 1997. The y-
20 axis shows cases per month per million population. And
21 the x-axis shows month of the year. There's an apparent
22 increase in cases between late spring to autumn, but the
23 reason for this apparent increase is not known.

24 This graphic shows some of the pathogens that

1 are being tracked by FoodNet on the y-axis. On the x-
2 axis, it shows the percent of isolates from hospitalized
3 individuals. Listeria had the highest hospitalization
4 rate in 1998. Compared with other pathogens like
5 Salmonella and Shigella, which occurred more often,
6 Listeria put more people into the hospital on a percent
7 basis.

8 Listeriosis also had the highest
9 hospitalization rate and the highest case fatality rate
10 in 1997, 1998.

11 In conclusion, I found by reviewing the
12 literature that Listeriosis is a deadly foodborne illness
13 that can be transmitted in many foods, but it is not
14 product specific. Of the FoodNet pathogens, Listeria has
15 the highest hospitalization rate and the highest case
16 fatality rate. Listeriosis cases could possibly increase
17 in the future due to our aging population and to the use
18 of immunosuppressive medications in surgery and due to
19 the AIDS epidemic. And intervention may decrease cases
20 of Listeriosis in the future. That's the end of my
21 presentation.

22 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Thank you, Dr. McCarthy.
23 Are there questions from the subcommittee? Bruce?

24 MR. BRUCE TOMPKIN: This is Bruce Tompkin. On

1 the conclusion, it states that Listeriosis is not product
2 specific. And in a general sense that may be true;
3 however, it is product-specific in terms of those foods
4 in which multiplication can occur.

5 DR. PATRICK McCARTHY: What I tried to point
6 out there is that it's in hot dogs; it's in vegetables;
7 it's in a variety of foods. And in that sense, it's not
8 product-specific.

9 MR. BRUCE TOMPKIN: So, within each of those
10 commodities, it is product-specific is what I was saying.

11 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Thank you. Other
12 questions? Yes, Mike.

13 MR. MICHAEL DOYLE: This is Mike Doyle. Could
14 you elaborate on this outbreak in Finland that was
15 associated with butter?

16 DR. PATRICK McCARTHY: I don't think I'm
17 prepared to at this time. I'd need some more time before
18 I could talk about that.

19 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other questions? Yes.

20 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Morris Potter. I'd just
21 like to point out for the committee that three of the
22 areas covered by surveillance in the last case-control
23 study fall into the FoodNet catchment area, so while all
24 of the studies on Listeriosis aren't the same, there is

1 some overlap that allows one to look for general trends.

2 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Thank you. Any other
3 questions?

4 Thank you very much for an excellent
5 presentation. Thank you.

6 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: Thank you.

7 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Our next speaker is Dr.
8 Richard Raybourne. He will be addressing characteristics
9 of *Listeria monocytogenes*, dose-response.

10 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: I'd like to thank the
11 committee for the opportunity to make this presentation
12 and also to thank the collaborators in the dose-response
13 effort whose names are listed there and two of whom are
14 in attendance today.

15 Next slide, please. There are probably many
16 ways to define -- or at least several ways to define
17 dose-response and the concept of the dose-response model.
18 I've chosen one that was in one of the other *Listeria*
19 risk assessments by Farber, et al., and that is the dose-
20 response model provides a functional relationship between
21 the probability that an individual will contract
22 *Listeriosis* and a specific dose or level of exposure to a
23 virulent strain of *Listeria monocytogenes*. And I thought
24 that was a reasonable definition, and I didn't think I

1 could improve on it very much. So, I just lifted it from
2 the paper.

3 In looking at the possible sources for
4 information on dose-response, there are four listed here.
5 The first we've heard something about in Dr. McCarthy's
6 previous talk -- that is, the epidemiology and case
7 report information. In addition to that, other possible
8 sources include animal studies and in-vitro studies of
9 various sorts which have addressed questions which are
10 also related to dose-response.

11 Go on to the next slide, please. Some of the
12 parameters that might go into calculating or developing a
13 dose-response model are, obviously, the number of
14 organisms; the food matrix or the food in which the
15 organisms are existing at the time that they are
16 consumed; the virulence of the particular Listeria
17 strain; and the host susceptibility -- that is, the
18 resistance or susceptibility of the host to infection.

19 By combining these various factors, you would
20 develop several types of outcomes ranging all the way
21 from asymptomatic carriage of Listeria through more mild
22 diarrheal-type illness to invasive disease to the
23 ultimate end point of death in some individuals and also
24 the fetal abortions, as well.

1 The first issue I'm going to touch on is the
2 issue of the food matrix. And this goes to the point
3 that was made earlier in regard to the data initially on
4 survival of Listeria in various foods, except the way
5 that I'm presenting or thinking of it here is in the more
6 qualitative sense of the effects of the types of
7 treatment as opposed to the quantitative or number of
8 things -- that is, to raise the question of whether
9 adaptation of Listeria to a acidic or a high-salt
10 environment can actually alter or result in the selection
11 or adaptation of a functionally more virulent population
12 of Listeria such as improving its ability to survive the
13 stomach acid barrier or within some host phagocytic
14 cells, as well as a result of adaptation to a harsh
15 environment. Whether the specific environment, the
16 specific stress in the food environment is actually the
17 same stress may not actually be relevant due to the sort
18 of global stress responses in some of these organisms
19 resulting in the phenomenon that's sometimes referred to
20 as cross tolerance among these pathogens.

21 In addition, another area that might well be
22 considered is the issue of the fat content in foods,
23 specifically again the question of whether a high-fat
24 content and the sort of relationship between Listeria and

1 the structure of the food and the fat mice cells, for
2 example, could actually protect Listeria from gastric
3 acid or even modulate its interaction with some host
4 cells, perhaps.

5 I have not directly found a tremendous amount
6 of evidence on this area. But I did find one reference
7 in -- I think it was in the Massachusetts outbreak where
8 there was actually a protective effect of skim milk
9 versus whole or 2 percent milk on one outbreak. I think
10 this is an area where additional data would also be
11 needed.

12 Moving on from the food matrix issue to the
13 area of numbers of organisms associated with illness,
14 this is a collection of basically case report and
15 epidemiological data which contains some dose information
16 in it in which an effort was made to quantify the level
17 of Listeria. And in some cases, an effort was also made
18 to determine what the consumption was to actually get to
19 a dose. So, in these cases where it just says, "The dose
20 was a given CFU," that means that it was normalized for
21 food intake. And in those where it says, "CFU per gram,"
22 it means that the intake of the food was uncertain. So,
23 we don't actually know how much was consumed.

24 Again, there may be other cases that I don't

1 know about or that our group doesn't know about. And we
2 would definitely appreciate information related to dose
3 from any other sources that the audience may know of.

4 What you can say about this is that there's
5 certainly a wide range of doses, and they're basically
6 all over the place in terms of the level of Listeria
7 implicated in illness. This type of data and various
8 other subsets of data like this have been used in three
9 other Listeria risk assessments to produce dose-response
10 models.

11 The next slide, please. In the dose-response
12 of studies in the Farber, et al. risk assessment, they
13 developed the dose-response curves for both high --
14 normal populations and high-risk populations based on a
15 Weibull-Gamma model. In this particular graph, it plots
16 the total number of Listeria monocytogenes cells versus
17 the probability of illness. This was based on
18 approximate ID-10 and ID-90 doses which were extrapolated
19 from case report information.

20 In another risk assessment, Buchanan, et al.
21 developed a conservative model using consumption data for
22 a single food source and Listeria incidence data. In
23 this dose curve, the plot is again the log of Listeria
24 monocytogenes cells versus the probability of illness.

1 Finally, more recently, another risk assessment
2 was done for Listeriosis derived from soft cheese
3 consumption. Again, this used the same mathematical
4 model. This is a little bit harder to sort of access
5 what the cystograms represent. But I will explain that
6 the plot here, the risk of illness from one serving of
7 cheese versus the probability of illness. The upper
8 curve represents the curve for the high-risk population,
9 and the lower curve represents the low-risk population.

10 The point here is not to particularly dwell on
11 these models but to make the point that there are some
12 limitations to the approach used in these studies. And,
13 clearly, these are all based on epidemiologic data
14 which -- in addition to this, in these studies, the
15 virulence is basically assumed in the sense that
16 virulence would be considered a more or less absolute
17 characteristic, either virulent or avirulent, and that
18 the host susceptibility in both of these studies -- in
19 all three of these risk assessments -- was identified as
20 an important variable. However, in terms of developing
21 ways to address the issue of relative susceptibility,
22 this was essentially based on, to use the term quoted
23 from one of the studies, a "rough approximation of the
24 relative susceptibility."

1 So, for the rest of the time, I'm going to try
2 to present some approaches by which we could use some
3 other data sources other than the epi-data and case
4 report data to try to improve the level of -- or decrease
5 the level of uncertainty in these dose-response models,
6 particularly dwelling on the issues of pathogen virulence
7 and host susceptibility.

8 And so, I'm going to present some animal and
9 various other kinds of -- and other kinds of data, in-
10 vitro data, which have been developed extensively in
11 Listeria since Listeria is a favored organism for both
12 microbiologists and immunologists alike.

13 This is a brief overview of the types of
14 studies that have been done and is not intended to be an
15 exhaustive review of Listeria virulence or immunological
16 mechanisms associated with Listeria. But the focus is on
17 what kind of data in these studies can be used to help us
18 in development of models.

19 First, dealing with the issue of pathogen
20 virulence. We might pose the question: Can experimental
21 virulence studies be used to identify a range of relative
22 Listeria virulence? If you'll look at our -- going back
23 to our data sources, in looking at human studies, as
24 we've heard, the outbreaks are focused on a small number

1 of predominant serotypes: the 1/2a, 1/2b and 4b.
2 Although, if you noticed in the slide on the outbreaks,
3 the butter outbreak was mentioned in there. And I
4 believe it was actually a serotype 3a. So, an exception
5 to every rule, I guess.

6 And it's important here, I think, to remember
7 when talking about these serotypes -- and also, the
8 phagetypes and ribotypes -- that these data are
9 essentially valuable epidemiologic tools but are not
10 necessarily mechanistically related to the virulence of
11 the organism as well, which I'm sure you're all aware of.

12 Next, please. One virulence factor that's been
13 studied extensively in in-vitro studies is
14 Listeriolysin O, which we've already heard discussed
15 today. Essentially, it's produced by all clinical
16 isolates of Listeria. And in-vitro studies have revealed
17 that it's required for survival within macrophage cell
18 lines, which are an important line of defense against
19 Listeria. But this is also not an absolute in that the
20 survival of even Listeriolysin O positive Listeria is
21 actually limited in in-vitro studies to a small
22 percentage of the bacteria, indicating that there is some
23 selection or adaptation that goes on in this system, as
24 well. Listeriolysin O negative strains, however, do not

1 survive at all in these in-vitro macrophage survival
2 models.

3 Functionally, the Listeriolysin O enables the
4 organism to escape from the phagolysosome of the
5 macrophage and mediate the next phase of its virulence
6 cascade or mechanisms which would be the cell-to-cell
7 spread. That is, Listeria can also invade nonphagocytic
8 cells -- such as liver cells, for example, and move
9 within epithelial cells -- and move within the cytoplasm
10 and spread from cell to cell by means of actin
11 polymerization. The molecule or the virulence
12 determinate responsible for this is a surface protein
13 Act A which mediates actin polymerization.

14 In addition to this, there are also a series of
15 proteins involved in getting the organism into the cell
16 in the first place. One of these is the Internalin
17 protein InLA which facilitates adherence to and invasion
18 of phagocytic cells.

19 Next, please. Looking at how these studies
20 based on essentially salt culture models pan out in
21 animal studies, it's observable that Listeriolysin
22 strains are all -- Listeriolysin O negative strains are
23 avirulent in mice in parenteral and oral inoculation
24 studies.

1 In addition to this, Act A negative strains
2 also show reduced infectivity in mice. And, finally,
3 another group of virulence determinates, the
4 phospholipases, play an important role in the ability of
5 Listeria to evade the early host neutrophil-mediated
6 defense mechanism in the mouse liver, which has been
7 shown in in-vitro studies.

8 So, we can look at what some of this data tells
9 us in terms of dose-response in the next slide. In this
10 study, this is a study based on oral inoculation and
11 shows a reduction in the number of colony-forming units
12 in the mouse spleen and liver comparing hemolysin
13 positive and hemolysin negative Listeria strains. So,
14 this gives us a kind of quantitative data based on the
15 presence or absence of hemolysin in an oral inoculation
16 model.

17 The next example shows the fact -- basically,
18 the take-home message from this is that the Listeriolysin
19 is not the whole story in terms of in-vivo virulence in
20 the animal models in that strains which have the
21 Listeriolysin but lack the phospholipase C are reduced in
22 virulence.

23 Putting all the sort of animal virulence factor
24 studies together into a model of what happens in the oral

1 infection in the mouse model in Listeria, you could
2 summarize it by saying that Listeria can attach via the
3 attachment virulence factors to either M-cells in the gut
4 or gut epithelial cells, become internalized, then move
5 through the cell via means of actin polymerization and
6 emerge on the other side of the gut barrier to be taken
7 up by macrophages, which they are capable of survival in,
8 and from there they're capable of then disseminating to
9 various tissues and causing various pathologies in the
10 animal.

11 Next, please. Looking at the last component of
12 the dose-response parameters, host susceptibility, the
13 question that we're posing here is: Can animal models of
14 immunocompromised states provide us with any useful
15 quantitative data on relative susceptibility in humans?
16 This is a fairly ambitious question. However, I think
17 that as we progress through there, you can see that there
18 may be some relationships that are possible to exploit in
19 this question.

20 We know from looking at human studies that
21 healthy adults are usually asymptomatic carriers.
22 Nonperinatal disease usually occurs in individuals as
23 various predisposing conditions. For example, pregnancy,
24 very young, infants, individuals with AIDS -- although,

1 this is actually kind of an interesting case because
2 parenthetically, when the AIDS epidemic first developed,
3 it was initially thought that Listeria would be a common
4 opportunistic infection. And, in fact, it turned out to
5 be actually a sort of unusual opportunistic infection in
6 AIDS, relatively speaking. And there's a reason for that
7 which will emerge later on in the discussion. Cancer,
8 immunosuppressive therapies of various kinds and,
9 finally, old age are other predisposing conditions.

10 What you can say about this is that all of
11 these predisposing conditions are likely to involve
12 different types of immunosuppression mechanisms. That is
13 to say, the factors that predispose in pregnancy are
14 probably different than the factors that may predispose
15 in cancer or in infancy or in old age on a mechanistic
16 level. And this is more or less what the mouse animal
17 model of Listeria infection tells us.

18 In fact, one of the most useful of these models
19 and instructive has been the use of the severe combined
20 immunodeficiency mouse model. And it was this model that
21 led to the realization that there was an extremely
22 important interaction of innate and adaptive immune
23 systems in the mouse. That is that the SCIDS mice, the
24 immune-deficient mice which lack either both T-cells and

1 B-cells, do not clear an infection but also, at the same
2 time, do not succumb readily to the infection. In fact,
3 they remain chronically infected, which was kind of a
4 surprise at the time of the initial observation, I would
5 think.

6 The neutralization, however, of the Cytokine
7 Interleukin 12 or tumor necrosis factor L for either one
8 of those results in an increase in the lethality of the
9 infection in SCIDS mice and an increase in CFUs to
10 quantify it again, thinking always of what quantitative
11 data we can get from this, by between 1 and 3 logs.

12 The take-home message from the SCIDS mouse
13 model is that in the absence of T-cells, the infection is
14 controlled but not eliminated. Various studies have
15 demonstrated that this effect is mediated by the
16 polymorphic nuclear leukocytes, neutrophils -- primarily,
17 monocytes, which are producing Interleukin 12 -- and NK-
18 cells, which are present in these animals which produce
19 NK or natural killer cells, which produce gamma
20 interferon, which is one of the most important host-
21 resistance mediators in the mouse model of Listeria.

22 On the next slide, this model, the SCIDS model
23 is summarized by showing on the top, "SCIDS Mice," which
24 remain heavily infected, chronically infected with

1 Listeria. But the Listeria is held in check by the
2 innate immune system mechanisms -- that is, the NK cells
3 and the neutrophil populations.

4 In the normal mice, these things are operating
5 early on in the infection until such time as the T-cell
6 mediated mechanisms kick in, resulting eventually in
7 sterile immunity in this model.

8 Looking at the next slide, you can see that
9 this has a direct impact on the dose-response to Listeria
10 in a system where neutrophils are depleted by a
11 monoclonal antibody against the neutrophil determinant.
12 The dose-response effect is really quite remarkable.
13 That is, the infective -- the lethal dose in this system
14 essentially drops from four times ten to the eighth to
15 four times ten to the fourth or a four-log increase in
16 susceptibility, you might put it, in this particular
17 mouse model in that zero of five of these -- it may even
18 go lower than this -- zero of five of the controls are
19 killed, whereas three of five of the neutrophil-depleted
20 animals are killed.

21 Next, please. The purpose of this slide is not
22 to have you figure out one single thing that's on this.
23 This is the pathway of the -- and I put it up here for
24 the point of showing that extensive studies have been

1 done to show, to elucidate the various pathways involved
2 in resistance.

3 The point is that within these various
4 mechanistic studies are embedded information on dose-
5 response to Listeria that is linked specifically to
6 certain kinds of immune mechanisms. These I have tried
7 to summarize on the next slide. Looking at various types
8 of ways to manipulate this system, you can see that
9 recombinant Interleukin-1 administered to the mouse
10 results in a 250-fold decrease in the level of infection
11 in the spleen.

12 Looking at the Interleukin 6 knockout, there's
13 a 300-fold effect. That is a knockout animal. But this
14 animal lacks Interleukin-6; therefore, in the absence of
15 that component of the immune system, there's a 300-fold
16 increase in CFUs.

17 Using, again, a monoclonal antibody to deplete
18 Interleukin-12, there's a 500-fold effect. Gamma
19 interferon is a thousand-fold effect. TNF alpha, also a
20 thousand-fold effect in the mouse model.

21 I wanted to also mention at this point, while
22 we're on the topic of Cytokines, what is happening and
23 some of the events that go on in the pregnancy model as
24 well because they fit in nicely to what we know from the

1 mouse studies. And that is that there's studies in both
2 human and animal systems that show there's actually an
3 inhibition of NK cell function during pregnancy. And we
4 know from the animal studies that NK cells are extremely
5 important in the resistance to Listeria infection.

6 In addition to this, there's a shifting of the
7 T-cell responses during pregnancy towards what's called a
8 Th2 or T-helper-2 type Cytokine secretion pattern. That
9 is, Interleukin-1, Interleukin-5 and Interleukin-10 are
10 produced. It's also been shown in other -- in studies in
11 the mouse model that the inhibition of Interleukin-4
12 actually has a beneficial effect on survival of mice
13 infected with Listeria monocytogenes so that those things
14 which tend to favor production of IL-2 are actually
15 detrimental in -- of Interleukin-4 are actually
16 detrimental in terms of the infection. And this is one
17 of the events that's going on during pregnancy.

18 In addition to this, it's also been reported
19 that spontaneous abortions in humans are associated with
20 an increase in the sort of yin-to-the-yang here, the Th1
21 Cytokine. When this type of response gains predominance,
22 it essentially begins to recognize the fetus as a foreign
23 body and reject it. And it's worth noting that Listeria
24 is one of the prime ways to attempt to drive this kind of

1 response. So, there may be a link there in the human
2 system that's doing what we can see in the animals.

3 Finally, of course, in terms of these animal
4 studies, there are some serious questions that need to be
5 asked about the use of these various animal models.
6 First of all, would be: Does the use of gene knockout or
7 monoclonal antibody-based deletion have any relevance in
8 humans?

9 Secondly, do the mechanisms defined in the
10 mouse model operate in human infections? There's very,
11 very little information on what is happening
12 mechanistically in human Listeriosis, at least that I've
13 found. Maybe, again, some of the committee members know
14 more information that I'm not aware of.

15 And finally, a kind of subset to this: Can the
16 host-resistance mechanisms identified in the animal
17 studies be connected with human biomarkers of exposure
18 and susceptibility? That is, can we use what we know are
19 important biomarkers in animals -- gamma interferon, TNF
20 alpha, for example -- and use them to answer questions
21 about human exposure and susceptibility to Listeria?

22 In the next slide, this is kind of a bit of a
23 tongue-in-cheek slide in a sense, coming from the
24 Washington Post just this past May 13th. Not to give

1 anyone the impression that the Centers and FDA might be
2 working at cross-purposes in some instances. But the
3 recently-approved drug, Enbrel, which has produced
4 spectacular results in treatment of rheumatoid arthritis,
5 may have caused serious infections in some patients, six
6 of who have died.

7 Enbrel is a biological response modifier,
8 chemically engineered to attract and neutralize tumor
9 necrosis factor alpha. Therefore, there is some
10 relationship in terms of what we know, at least about
11 Listeria infection in mice and these kinds of drugs.

12 In addition to that, one could only anticipate
13 that as more of these mechanisms are investigated and the
14 drug design becomes more sophisticated, there will be
15 more and more therapies like this that are not just
16 general immunosuppressive therapies, but very
17 specifically targeted to certain immune mechanisms. So
18 that there may be more and more instances where sort of
19 designer drugs can knock out specific components of the
20 immune system to a good effect in the treatment of
21 inflammatory disease, but to a possible detrimental
22 effect in terms of susceptibility to illness.

23 Secondly, as has been mentioned previously,
24 we're in the process of developing in conjunction with

1 the University of Georgia the Rhesus-pregnancy model.
2 And in addition to the dose-response data -- which will
3 undoubtedly not be available for the July 6th deadline,
4 but hopefully sometime in the future, the absolute
5 numbers in dose-response -- we're also trying to develop
6 some biomarker data in conjunction with that study so
7 that we can then if not look at -- if we can then verify
8 what's happening in the mouse model and this sort of
9 closely-related non-human primate model, it may go a long
10 way to validating the use of the animal data in terms of
11 modelling the relative susceptibility.

12 Next, please. Going back to the first slide
13 and sort of summing it up and restating or stating maybe
14 clearly for the first time, how we're going to use these
15 various pieces of data or how we're proposing to use
16 these pieces of data, in terms of the issue of numbers of
17 organisms and food matrix, we're proposing to develop
18 distributions for probability of illness based on the
19 human data.

20 Ultimately, we hope in the future to be able to
21 incorporate information from the dose-response studies
22 ongoing now when they become available. We also will,
23 hopefully, as more information from epi-studies comes
24 available, that will also be incorporated. But at the

1 present, we're essentially operating from the same data
2 set that other risk assessment efforts have operated from
3 in terms of human data.

4 Next, please. In terms of organism virulence,
5 we're proposing the concept of using the in-vitro and
6 animal data to model a range of virulence for *Listeria*
7 *monocytogenes* to determine -- rather than a sort of a
8 plus-minus virulence situation, to see if that could be--
9 help refine the model.

10 And, finally, in terms of host susceptibility,
11 we're hoping to explore the use of the animal, primarily
12 mouse data, to model relative susceptibility in various
13 immune-compromised states. Ultimately, we would like to
14 correlate the mouse biomarkers with the primate model as
15 surrogates for human infection.

16 And that's pretty much the status of the dose-
17 response effort and data forces. Thank you.

18 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Thank you, Dr. Raybourne,
19 for an excellent presentation.

20 We're going to just break from regular
21 procedure a little bit. It's warm in this room, and our
22 audience is probably wilting. We're going to take a 20-
23 minute break. What that will allow people to do is to
24 break down this wall and open up the two rooms to air

1 this out a little bit. And then the next one will be our
2 committee discussion with all the speakers and our
3 National Advisory people.

4 So, 2:25, come on back.

5 (Whereupon, a recess was had in this
6 matter.

7 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Let us get started on the
8 afternoon session. Before we do, there's one little
9 housekeeping point. Committee members need to turn in
10 their -- they've got a calendar for August through
11 December as far as availability for meetings. Fill that
12 out and leave it with the staff in the hallway.

13 We're going to have our committee discussion
14 with all the committee members plus the presenters for
15 today. Keep in mind, if there are any questions that any
16 of you have about the document itself, now is the time to
17 bring those up. And also, keep in mind the three
18 questions that were first presented this morning.

19 Question one: Is the scientific approach
20 sound? The second question was: Do they have all the
21 right data? And the third one is: Have they overlooked
22 anything? With that, we'll -- Yes?

23 DR. ALISON O'BRIEN: I'm not a regular member
24 of this committee. May I ask a question?

1 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Absolutely. Identify
2 yourself.

3 DR. ALISON O'BRIEN: I'm a member of the Food
4 Safety Committee. It's Dr. Alison O'Brien.

5 I wanted to ask a question of the last speaker,
6 Dr. Raybourne, who is right next to me. Dr. Raybourne,
7 you were talking about using animal model data, pili
8 mouse model data as part of your dose-response
9 assessment, guesstimates, estimates.

10 Are you aware of the older data from Christina
11 Cheers (phonetic) looking at innate susceptibility of
12 different mouse strains to Listeria? Because there was
13 nothing about the basic genetic host background in your
14 discussions today. You talked about Cytokine response
15 being modulated. And I can't remember, unfortunately --
16 I'm gonna say what I think she found. And she found
17 there was a gene in mice that controlled early response
18 to infection which allowed certain strains of mice to be
19 several logs more susceptible to Listeria than others. I
20 think it was a complement, actually, complement-mediated
21 factor on mouse chromosome 5. And you never -- I could
22 be wrong about that, and I don't want to mislead. But
23 there's a whole set of data on that.

24 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Rich Raybourne, FDA.

1 Yes, I'm aware of that data. I think it's kind of, as I
2 recall, almost a mirror image of the salmonella ITY data;
3 is it not?

4 DR. ALISON O'BRIEN: It is not.

5 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: The strains are
6 different, though.

7 DR. ALISON O'BRIEN: It is not the same gene;
8 and it doesn't have exactly the same mouse profile in the
9 product, no. But the product of the gene is not ITY, IEN
10 RAM now. It's a different gene, and I think it affected
11 complement, C-5 component of complement. I believe the
12 AJ strain of mice, which is low in that complement
13 component, was particularly susceptible to Listeria.

14 So, since you're using mouse models, I thought
15 you might go back and check that. My data may be wrong,
16 but I know it isn't the same profile as salmonella
17 exactly.

18 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Yeah, that's -- I'm
19 agreeing with you. I'm saying it's not the same.

20 DR. ALISON O'BRIEN: Oh, it's not the same.

21 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: I think it's -- in the
22 C-57 is relatively more resistant in Listeria and it's
23 more susceptible in salmonella.

24 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other questions?

1 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: But that's a good
2 point. Thank you.

3 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Bruce?

4 MR. BRUCE TOMPKIN: Bruce Tompkin. I just had
5 one question. Both of you mentioned carriage,
6 asymptomatic carriage. Another one was the phrase where
7 healthy adults are usually asymptomatic carriers. Is
8 this a reality? Are there carriers whereby normal,
9 healthy individuals may have an indigenous population of
10 *Listeria monocytogenes* in the GI tract? Or is it a
11 transient, just as a result of consuming food; and when
12 stool surveys are conducted, they merely show up as a
13 positive because of whatever exposure?

14 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: In the studies that I
15 referred to, they were point prevalence. And so, they
16 simply were there at the time. In the German studies,
17 several thousand people were involved. And they found it
18 in those individuals.

19 They found higher rates when they tested the
20 same person over a period of time. It's my understanding
21 that there are people that are carrying the organism but
22 do not show symptoms. How long they carry the organism,
23 I don't know.

24 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes, David?

1 MR. DAVID ACHESON: David Acheson. That, to
2 me, raises of the question of any data out there on
3 person-to-person transmission.

4 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: This is Pat McCarthy: I
5 did see one study -- and, of course, I can't remember
6 exactly the name of the study at this time -- but there
7 was a suggestion that individuals living in the same
8 household may have -- there may have been transmission
9 person-to-person. But, for the most part, in all the
10 studies I looked at, that was not an issue. Person-to-
11 person transmission was not an issue.

12 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other questions from the
13 committee? Yes, Michael?

14 MR. MICHAEL DOYLE: This is Mike Doyle.
15 Richard, I think I noticed on your slide, you had a
16 estimated dose of ten to the ninth for the butter-
17 associated outbreak. Did I read that right?

18 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Rich Raybourne. It
19 should not -- if that's what it said, it shouldn't have
20 said that. I think the dose was, as I recall, ranging
21 between a hundred and about ten to the fourth.

22 MR. MICHAEL DOYLE: Yeah. That was the count
23 from the butter. But above that, I think I saw ten to
24 the ninth. And I was curious to know how you arrived at

1 that number.

2 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: No. I think the number
3 is much lower than that.

4 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other questions? Bruce?

5 MR. BRUCE TOMPKIN: We haven't really discussed
6 the document. And I only have two questions. The
7 simplest is figure one. I've tried to understand it, and
8 I don't. And there's no sense spending time on it now.
9 But I couldn't figure it out -- the top portion, in
10 particular.

11 But my other comment really was relating to
12 Page 6. And as part of the background information where
13 this is just all background and introduction, Pages 4, 5
14 and 6, and it's not in here -- and I'd just like to
15 suggest perhaps you may wish to do this -- but it is to
16 actually compare the policies. I know the intent of this
17 risk assessment is not to address policy at this point in
18 time. But as a matter of comparison, I thought it would
19 be helpful to compare the policies in other comparable
20 countries, industrialized countries, in terms of their
21 Listeria policies, the numbers of cases per hundred
22 thousand -- and I know CDC will wince at that thought
23 because no one has as good a system as the United States
24 what the data are saying.

1 Anyway, the number of cases per hundred
2 thousand and also any information on percent of positive
3 food samples with the intent to see whether or not
4 there's any relationship between the policy, the actual
5 exposure in terms of percent positive foods that are
6 reported in those countries, and then the public health
7 impact. And that would just be a matter of background
8 information at this point. That's all it would be. It
9 would not be anything actionable, as I understand, from
10 this risk assessment.

11 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Cathy?

12 MS. CATHY DONNELLY: Cathy Donnelly. I'd just
13 like to follow up on Bruce's point and put in a plug for
14 a comment that was made earlier today in the public
15 comments section. And that being a focus on production
16 practices that leads to production of a food. And the
17 case that was being discussed was cheeses, and the focus
18 of the risk assessment was on food type or cheese type.
19 And I'd like to put in an appeal for production
20 practices, i.e. farmstead cheese versus cheeses made in
21 the manufacturing plant. And I think you'll see a big
22 difference in incidents.

23 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other comments,
24 questions? Yes, Dane?

1 MR. DANE BERNARD: Thank you. Dane Bernard,
2 not an immunologist. So, take your question for what
3 it's worth. The fine report on how we're gonna model
4 immune response, how do you plan to take what you've got
5 and translate that into what I think most of us would
6 accept as a population who distributes a wide range of
7 immunological conditions which vary. I guess I'm just
8 curious because we've got models that show different
9 parts of how the immune response can be activated or not
10 activated against this particular challenge.

11 But how do you go from where we're at now to
12 what you, what I think will need to do, which is look at
13 the human condition and the whole host of immunological
14 conditions from whatever you call normal or whatever we
15 rank as normal down to those who are very, very severely
16 immunocompromised?

17 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Rich Raybourne, FDA. I
18 think that the issue that you're raising is one that
19 we're at the moment struggling with as well. I think
20 that clearly there's a spectrum of -- going to be a
21 spectrum of immunocompromised individuals. I don't think
22 at the moment we have a good handle on ways that we can
23 realistically measure that in the population as a whole
24 to even get it, to get at what proportion of the

1 population is, quote, unquote, "immunocompromised" and to
2 what degree they're immunocompromised. It's kind of a
3 technically daunting task.

4 I think that the positive side of using the
5 data that I -- of sort -- of the type that I presented is
6 that it's at least a quantifiable measure as opposed to
7 kind of a rough approximation. I think we need to try to
8 also in as many ways as we can make sure that what we
9 learn from the animal models, particularly the mouse
10 models, is translatable into the human situation. This
11 is particularly difficult in Listeria because there's
12 essentially no prospect for doing any kind of human
13 clinical trials in Listeriosis. And so, the best
14 approach that we have right now is to try to develop a
15 surrogate model, which we're trying to do in a primate,
16 in a primate system.

17 It might also be possible, for example, to
18 develop some of this kind of correlative human data in
19 outbreaks or in following up on patients involved in
20 outbreaks. But it just hasn't really been done to any
21 extent at the present time. So, it's a good issue, but
22 I'm sorry we don't have a better answer at the moment for
23 you.

24 MR. DANE BERNARD: Follow-up, if I might?

1 We've got data on those populations which seem to be more
2 at-risk -- this is outbreak data -- who gets Listeriosis
3 predominantly and who doesn't. We know enough, I think--
4 not an immunologist. We know enough basis, what you've
5 presented, I think, to theorize what some of the
6 mechanisms of susceptibility might be in those
7 categories.

8 Have you thought into that scenario to see if
9 there's any mileage there? I mean, for example, the less
10 than one-year-old group. We know the immune system is
11 still developing, immature, unchallenged, da, da, da, da.
12 Based on the mouse models that you've got, is there
13 anything that applies there? At the other end of the
14 spectrum, same thing.

15 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Rich Raybourne again.
16 I think in terms of doing those kinds of studies, we
17 should look at, for example, in levels of quantifiable
18 types of markers, like the Cytokines I mentioned, in
19 these populous -- it's theoretically possible to do that.
20 The problem with doing that -- at least my understanding
21 of it -- is in the absence of an ongoing infection
22 measuring levels of circulating Cytokines is not going to
23 be very worthwhile. And at the very least, what you
24 would want to do to get into sort of a more technical way

1 of approaching this, if I could, what you would want to
2 do is to somehow collect materials from these
3 individuals, stimulate them in-vitro and look at the
4 ability of the cells to respond. I mean, it would be a
5 huge and expensive task to do this kind of thing.

6 There may be other simpler ways you can measure
7 this, looking at -- and non-invasive ways, too. And
8 we're currently trying to think of approaches to this in
9 terms of even to the point of doing serological-type
10 surveys, although this is problematic in Listeria because
11 there's not a lot of evidence that I'm aware of that
12 serum antibody responses are important in resistance to
13 Listeria. So, I mean, it's a great question. I wish we
14 could answer it and come up with an approach to it. And
15 we've certainly thought about it but have not done that
16 at this point.

17 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Morris Potter. Rich, I
18 think what Dane is suggesting is that say, for instance,
19 in the geriatric literature, it's known more or less
20 which subsets go first. And, therefore, if we can look
21 at susceptibilities of various mouse strains that are
22 absent, those things that go in 50-year-olds and then the
23 things that start to go when we hit 60 and so forth, that
24 we might be able to then model the human population for

1 those age groups and suggest when people are going to
2 become more susceptible to infection, when they're going
3 to become more susceptible to serious invasive disease
4 and that sort of thing.

5 MR. WILLIAM JAHNCKE: Bob?

6 MR. ROBERT BUCHANAN: Bob Buchanan, FDA. Yeah,
7 I think I'd like to echo on what Morrie says. I'm
8 wondering if you may be making this more complicated than
9 is warranted considering the huge range of -- and
10 certainly, you're going to face with the rest of your
11 risk assessment. Morrie and Jim Smith and I did a
12 presentation a bunch of years ago on trying to get some
13 estimates of increased risks associated with aging. And
14 while certainly you're gonna have to come up with some
15 kind of fudge factor to relate the increased
16 susceptibility, it was not very difficult to find some
17 age-related decreases in, for example, T-cell
18 proliferation. It was not difficult to come up with age-
19 related equations that we could develop for achlorhydria
20 in the aged. So, I'm wondering if we couldn't just start
21 off with trying a couple of fairly simple relationships
22 that have been gleaned from these broad population
23 studies, start simple. And if it didn't work, then get
24 more sophisticated.

1 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Rich Raybourne again.
2 I think that's a good approach, yes.

3 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes?

4 DR. WESLEY LONG: I do want to make one point,
5 though.

6 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Identify yourself,
7 please, Wes.

8 DR. WESLEY LONG: Wes Long, FDA. That it's
9 consistent with some of our conversations yesterday that
10 what we're doing is, you know, we don't have all the data
11 now certainly, clearly. But what we're doing is laying a
12 framework at this stage and using that to figure out what
13 to do next. And we talked about how we can modify the
14 risk assessments as more information becomes available.
15 So, I think this sort of thinking is important.

16 Rich sort of mixed up the data we'd like to get
17 from outbreaks, that sort of thing, which is future,
18 which we don't have now. But by doing this sort of
19 thinking now, I'm hoping that we will sort of lay the
20 groundwork, even though we may not be able to utilize
21 some of the things that he's talking about immediately.

22 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes?

23 DR. ALISON O'BRIEN: This is Alison O'Brien.
24 Following up on what Bob Buchanan said about T-cell

1 proliferation, some kind of marker that suggests you
2 might be more susceptible to Listeria. The question goes
3 back to something Dr. Raybourne said during his talk.
4 Why aren't a lot of AIDS patients infected with Listeria,
5 or are there? I mean, I know that I saw that as a
6 subcategory. But to me, it seems a surprisingly small
7 portion, given that if we accept the paradigm that this
8 is an organism that uses protective immunity as related
9 to cell-mediated immunity, not pneumo-immunity.

10 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Rich Raybourne again.
11 In terms of the AIDS question, I think part of the answer
12 -- and you're right. It's not as common as you would
13 think it would be among AIDS patients. And this was one
14 of the sort of statements in their first papers that came
15 out when there were finally some Listeria AIDS cases.
16 And I think part of the reason for that may relate to the
17 observations with the effects of, for example, the
18 Interleukin 4 and the fact that it acts -- which in CD-4
19 deficient patients, is going to be lower. And in the
20 mouse model, when you neutralize -- and this is not a
21 complete answer, but it's sort of a clue -- that if you
22 neutralize IL-4, you actually ameliorate the Listeria
23 infection in the mouse model. So, it has kind of a
24 detrimental effect.

1 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes, go ahead.

2 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: This is Pat McCarthy.
3 It's true that in AIDS patients, in some of the earlier
4 literature, researchers were saying that it's not very
5 common in the AIDS patients. But then about '86, '87,
6 '88, there was an estimate that AIDS patients have
7 Listeriosis about 150 times more often. Then, more
8 recent, I believe there was another estimate that AIDS
9 patients may have Listeriosis about 280 times as often.

10 So, it's true that in the beginning, the
11 researchers were wondering why Listeriosis wasn't showing
12 up in AIDS patients. But as more information became
13 available, estimates started to increase.

14 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes, Bob?

15 MR. ROBERT BUCHANAN: Bob Buchanan, FDA. Yeah,
16 I just wanted to affirm that. My recollection was that
17 the approximate increase in risk associated with
18 Listeriosis and AIDS was about 300-fold. So, I think
19 there is a very substantial increase in risk.

20 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Dane?

21 MR. DANE BERNARD: Thank you. Dane Bernard,
22 not an immunologist. Still not. But we're not on
23 immunology.

24 Another factor, I think, when you look at the

1 data on incidence of Listeriosis in people with AIDS,
2 you've got to look at the interventions that go on there
3 as well. Prophylactic use of antibiotics, extensive
4 dietary advice, is all provided once a person is
5 diagnosed in that category. So, there's a risk
6 mitigation or risk management strategy there, I think,
7 that has a strong intervention that you're seeing showing
8 up in health statistics.

9 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other comments and
10 questions from the committee?

11 Yes, Bruce?

12 MR. BRUCE TOMPKIN: This is Bruce Tompkin. I'd
13 like to have a little clearer understanding as to how
14 information is to be given to the risk assessment team.
15 If someone has data, do they just say, "Here, Dick
16 Whiting. Here it is"? Or is there a mechanism -- I know
17 that you went through with a published announcement in
18 the Federal Register, and so there's probably a formal
19 mechanism. But how do we know that information provided
20 will be used or considered and so on? And once provided,
21 to what degree -- I know this process is one of the
22 processes we're going through now. This is a public
23 process. This is an open process. So, I assume data
24 that's provided will become public or available to the

1 public.

2 Could you help me with that a little bit?

3 DR. RICHARD WHITING: Richard Whiting. Yeah.
4 There's a paragraph or two in that Federal Register
5 Notice as a result of some of the discussions with us and
6 our lawyers and so on, that I think we're probably
7 breaking some new ground for FDA here, as well.

8 The information that would be submitted, I
9 think you would have to expect that it would become
10 public information. But we did say in there that we
11 would accept information that has been summarized or
12 blinded and various terminologies like this. So, if,
13 say, the meat industry, for example, through one of your
14 trade associations wanted to do a quick survey of
15 whatever Listeria your members might have, and the trade
16 association would just present a summary to us, that
17 would be the information that we would have.

18 And as risk assessors, we would then try to
19 evaluate that information as best we can. The more
20 information, the more details you could provide, the more
21 useful the information would be to us. But we'll accept
22 what is offered. I would like to think that if some data
23 came in, we might have an indication of what methods were
24 used, what sensitivity -- if it was presence/absence

1 data, what sensitivity might be there.

2 But, again, we will just accept to try to use
3 whatever people are willing to submit to us. And we
4 recognize this is sort of a new situation, I think, for
5 all of us. And we're gonna try to use this as a
6 scientific process and not a regulatory process, and I
7 guess we'll have to see how it goes.

8 MR. MORRIS POTTER: This is Morris Potter. If
9 I could amplify on that a little bit. Part of the
10 rationale for using risk assessment is that it's a
11 transparent process and that people who look at the risk
12 assessment ought to be able to repeat it using different
13 assumptions. And that does create a need to make the
14 data sources available. If there are data that could be
15 useful for the risk assessment but that might be felt
16 inappropriate to become public, they may still be useful
17 in terms of trying to validate things internally. But I
18 think that our preference is to use risk assessment to
19 help in making our decisions on risk more transparent,
20 more understandable to the broader audience.

21 We wouldn't want to turn our backs on data that
22 could be useful. And if you have things that you'd like
23 to discuss, we can chat with you.

24 Wes, did you have any clarification on that?

1 DR. WESLEY LONG: I do. First of all -- This
2 is Wes Long, FDA. I have the answer to this because it
3 was reported in Food Chemical News on the back cover page
4 there about six weeks ago that the Risk Assessment
5 Clearing House set up through the Food Safety Initiative
6 was going to be collecting the Listeria data.

7 I'm not sure what the source of that
8 information was. But there is a Risk Assessment
9 Clearinghouse that is at the University of Maryland
10 that's a part of FDA's new Joint Institute for Food
11 Safety and Applied Nutrition. And we are in the process
12 of -- This clearinghouse is intended to be a repository
13 for data methods, models, anything to do with risk
14 assessment, initially focusing on microbial risk
15 assessment needs.

16 Dave Lineback (phonetic), who is the -- I'm not
17 sure of his title, the chair or the head --

18 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Director.

19 DR. WESLEY LONG: The Director, thank you. The
20 Director of the Joint Institute for Food Safety and
21 Applied Nutrition will take responsibility -- at this
22 point, we're not really set up, but we could be set up
23 very soon to take data. He will take the responsibility
24 to do sort of a secondary cleansing of data. I think you

1 would want to -- if you had to blind the data, you would
2 probably want to do that first. But he would be a second
3 mechanism to do that. And he would provide the
4 assurance, again, that -- of course, all of the
5 information that goes in the Clearinghouse does become
6 public. But that FDA would never -- this is an
7 opportunity to blind the data again and further assure
8 submitters of the confidentiality of that information.

9 So, Dave Lineback -- I could give you
10 information about how to get in contact with him. That
11 might be another way to get that information.

12 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Morrie?

13 MR. MORRIS POTTER: I guess if I could recap
14 where we are, Richard has suggested that there is
15 information in the Federal Register where you can send
16 it. Wes has suggested that you could send it to Dave.
17 And, in fact, you could also send it to Richard or to me
18 or to Joe Levitt (phonetic) or to anybody else in the
19 building, and we will see that it gets to the right
20 place.

21 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes, Bob?

22 MR. ROBERT BUCHANAN: And to answer the second
23 half of your question, Bruce, on how to tell whether or
24 not the data is being used similar to the document that

1 you have in front of you that outlines the data sources
2 that are being considered, the risk assessment itself
3 will detail the data that was selected for use and the
4 criteria for using it. So, if your data didn't get used,
5 you would know it by reading the final document.

6 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other comments and
7 questions? Yes, Dane?

8 MR. DANE BERNARD: Thank you. Dane Bernard.
9 Pat, you covered a number of things in your review of the
10 epidemiological information. Some of us, I think, who
11 have watched outbreak information and epidemiological
12 studies for some years, occasionally run across things
13 that we don't necessarily agree with, that maybe they
14 weren't in fact quite as well-established as we thought
15 they might have been.

16 Is there any need to or will you be reviewing
17 any of the source information on past studies to see
18 whether it meets some kind of criteria of acceptability
19 in terms of whether we, in fact, have targeted all the
20 right foods or maybe have targeted one or two too many as
21 being implicated in outbreaks?

22 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Please identify yourself.

23 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: Pat McCarthy. Before I
24 refer some data over to Clark Carrington who's going to

1 be doing the modelling, I am going to look at it to make
2 sure that it seems reasonable to me that the cases are
3 well-described and that it has the basic information in
4 there, including the rationale for implicating the
5 particular food.

6 I'm going to try to summarize the data a little
7 bit, in addition to giving them the raw data. But
8 summarize the data a little bit to give them an
9 indication of how often a particular food or type of food
10 is being referred to in the studies that I refer to. So,
11 yes, I'm going to try to be critical in terms of which
12 studies are referred.

13 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Bob?

14 MR. ROBERT BUCHANAN: Bob Buchanan, FDA. In
15 yesterday's session on vibrio parahaemolyticus, we spent
16 quite a long time on the dose-response area talking about
17 multiple biological end points and what would be
18 appropriate to model in the case of vibrio. And that's a
19 fairly classic enteric pathogen. You deal with
20 colonization of the intestinal tract as one biological
21 end point.

22 Sepsis is a second biological end point.
23 Gastroenteritis is an intermediate biological end point.
24 In your presentation, Pat, you gave several different

1 potential biological end points. And, Rich, you provided
2 a model for infection that would not be too dissimilar
3 from what we were discussing yesterday on vibrio.

4 Have you decided yet on what will be your
5 biological end points that you're going to be modelling
6 or considering? Are you going to do multiple ones? Is
7 it going to be one for sepsis, one for meningitis, one
8 for neonates?

9 DR. PATRICK MCCARTHY: This is Pat McCarthy. I
10 had planned to take a look at the studies and, again, to
11 put them together in terms of -- in a lot of different
12 ways. Organize the data for the model in a lot of
13 different ways. And, certainly, sepsis and meningitis
14 are two big end points. I was going to try to give the
15 modeler an estimate of how often those particular end
16 points come up in the literature that I reviewed. And
17 also, since the more mild symptoms, there seems to be
18 several studies that refer to mild symptoms, I was also
19 going to give them an estimate of how often that seems to
20 show up.

21 In terms of headache or chills or abdominal
22 pain, I'm not there yet in terms of how I'm going to
23 group that data; but it might be -- I do have estimates
24 in different papers of how often subjects or cases had

1 diarrhea or had chills. And so, I haven't really decided
2 how I'm going to give it to them, but I'm going to try to
3 be open when I do and give it to him the way that's most
4 productive for him.

5 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Yes, Bob?

6 MR. ROBERT BUCHANAN: Sort of a follow-up on
7 this, now directed towards Rich.

8 Rich, do we have any estimates on the
9 probability of colonization or attachment? In presenting
10 your model of the infection, you just sort of said
11 "attachment," and you didn't really deal with that.

12 Do we have any estimates on what it takes to
13 get attachment, or are there different known attachment
14 mechanisms? Can you come up with any kind of probability
15 of attachment?

16 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Identify yourself,
17 please.

18 DR. RICHARD RAYBOURNE: Yes. Rich Raybourne,
19 FDA.

20 In the model I presented, I mentioned the
21 Internalin, which is essentially an attachment-type
22 virulence determinant. In terms of numbers associated
23 with colonization, I'm not aware -- I don't have that
24 information right now. There may, in fact, be some

1 because a number of oral infectivity studies have been
2 done. And whether they used attachment as an end point
3 or not, I'm aware of one study where they looked at
4 invasion in the intestinal wall and quantified organisms
5 invading the intestine of the mouse. But beyond that,
6 no, I don't know of any.

7 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Other questions and
8 comments?

9 Our next presenter, before we have it, on
10 behalf of the subcommittee, we'd certainly like to
11 express our appreciation to all the presenters today and
12 all the hard work. The product is coming along quite
13 nicely. Thank you very much.

14 Our next presenter is Dr. Richard Whiting. And
15 he is going to be giving a summary of what has been
16 presented and discussed, presented today.

17 DR. RICHARD WHITING: I'm just going to be very
18 brief in light of this good discussion we had. But maybe
19 we can start with Bruce's question on this disputed
20 figure here. This is the one Bruce is referring to. We
21 did have some comments on the draft phase, but I guess we
22 didn't get around to revising it. But it's just trying
23 to say here at the top, "Food consumption, food
24 contamination." These two go together to form your

1 exposure. And then this middle part, "Food Vehicle
2 Virulence and Susceptibility" is the disease triangle
3 idea, the hazard assessment, and that leading on to
4 illness. It's trying to give a little sense of flow to
5 it. I guess I can see we can do a little bit of editing
6 and reworking of that to make it a little bit more clear.

7 There's kind of an old saying that risk
8 assessment people have had, "Let the data speak." And I
9 guess that's largely where we are at this point in the
10 risk assessment. You can see we've accumulated a lot of
11 information. We've given you some ideas of where we
12 would like to go with it.

13 The next stage for the risk assessors is to try
14 to take all of this information and, really, just see
15 what we can do with it, see what the information can be
16 summarized as. And I think you've seen the problems with
17 trying to combine the information on the presence of
18 Listeria in foods with the consumption.

19 That data base that Mary has -- I forgot. She
20 had something like eight or ten different categories of
21 hamburgers. And then when you get to data like the
22 cheeses, we have some good consumption information on
23 some of the Hispanic cheeses, for example. But then
24 these data bases don't say anything about whether this

1 was pasteurized or unpasteurized cheese. And this is the
2 kind of information that we have to try now to pool
3 together and bring out of it the conclusions that we feel
4 are justified in bringing out. And we may find there
5 will be quite a few areas where we will just say there is
6 not information available that we can go further. And
7 part of the exercise of doing a risk assessment like this
8 is to highlight the data gaps.

9 I also think that this will be an iterative-
10 type of process. I think it will be occurring both
11 within the next few months, and I can see us doing an
12 initial summary of the data, which will perhaps highlight
13 certain areas that we will then go back out and try to
14 find more detailed information on.

15 And I can see sort of this second round as a
16 point where we will probably try to get in contact with
17 various people in the industry who might have information
18 on specific consumptions, you know, my question of
19 pasteurized versus unpasteurized in certain groups of
20 cheeses. Or perhaps the industry might have some
21 information on consumption patterns or food preparation
22 habits. Various questions like this which we don't have
23 yet but might be very relevant for particular classes of
24 food.

1 So, I see this as an iterative-type process,
2 and it will probably continue beyond the September,
3 October date that we have set as a target for completion
4 of the first part of the risk assessment.

5 And we've also made quite a few references here
6 today to various research projects that are underway, the
7 primate pregnant monkey primate study, and various
8 studies like this -- which obviously won't be ready by
9 September and October but yet, obviously, we want to take
10 that and look at the risk assessment again as soon as
11 that data becomes available.

12 I have been quite heartened today by, I think,
13 the sense of participation here by the industry. I was
14 on the Salmonella enteritis and egg risk assessment team
15 that the USDA did a year or so ago. And at that point,
16 we sort of approached the industry. And I would say they
17 approached us back with quite a bit of trepidation. And
18 we really did not get very much back that was helpful to
19 it. I think there was a lot of apprehension about what
20 the whole risk assessment process is about. I hope
21 everyone is becoming a little bit more aware of just what
22 a risk assessment is and what it does and that people
23 will be a little more willing to participate in this. I
24 think for all of us, our goals are increased food safety.

1 And I really do put a plug out there and echo again the
2 conversation we did just have about the submission of
3 data and blinded data. And I really do put an invitation
4 out to industry and everyone to become active and follow
5 it. And if you have specific information that you can
6 bring to us, that you do that.

7 So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very
8 much.

9 MR. MICHAEL JAHNCKE: Thank you very much.
10 Again, thanks to your entire group. Certainly appreciate
11 it and thank you.

12 Morrie, I'll turn this over to you.

13 MR. MORRIS POTTER: I'd like to add
14 congratulations to the risk assessment team. That was
15 very nicely done. And on behalf of FDA and FSIS, I would
16 like once more to invite participants today who are not
17 members of the committee to come to the mike, identify
18 yourself and make whatever statements you'd like to about
19 the risk assessment model that was presented today, the
20 direction the team is taking or other comments on the
21 risk of foodborne Listeriosis.

22 Perhaps while people are thinking about that,
23 I'd like to direct a question to Wally. The question
24 arose earlier about colonization. And I wondered if you

1 had any information on either transient or long-term
2 colonization from your clinical experience.

3 MR. WALLY SCHLECH: Thanks, Morrie. Wally
4 Schlech from Delhausen. I don't have any information
5 other than to say we did some carriage studies during the
6 now-ancient maritime outbreak in family members,
7 primarily, and did find some carriage. We assume that's
8 probably because they were eating the same items in the
9 menu and during the time we were sampling which, in fact,
10 was often 30 -- probably several months after the case,
11 were able to find some Listeria. But whether these were
12 new items or leftover from the previous, I don't know.

13 I think there are some Dutch studies -- I
14 believe in Europe, some old studies of longitudinal
15 carriage, as I recall. I think, although most people
16 would suggest that carriage is transient, that it may
17 remain in the bowel flora for a period of time. So, I'm
18 not certain.

19 I think I wanted to raise a question about the
20 biological endpoints. I think the febrile
21 gastroenteritis syndrome is very much a distinct entity.
22 And the thing that wasn't talked about today is the
23 extraordinarily high attack rates within the exposed
24 group for that particular syndrome, whereas mostly the

1 Listeriosis you see, even in the outbreak situation, the
2 attack rates in the overall population are quite low.

3 I think there is some evidence that that may be
4 more related to a huge dose and possibly even local. So,
5 maybe the hemolysin acts as a local cytotoxin in the gut
6 for a period or something. I don't know.

7 But I think there is some data. I've done some
8 work in gastrointestinal carriage in mice and rats. And
9 we can see carriage persist for a couple of weeks in the
10 droppings. But we haven't really gone beyond that at
11 this point in time.

12 And there certainly doesn't seem to be any
13 specific attachment factors. The Internalin protein, I
14 think, is an interesting protein. But in terms of the
15 things we think about, pili and other sort of typical
16 attachment factors, Listeria doesn't exhibit them. And
17 we really don't have any information there.

18 MR. MORRIS POTTER: Thanks, Wally. Other
19 comments? In that case, I think we can wrap this up.
20 Tomorrow morning we start again at 8:00 for the plenary
21 session of the National Food Advisory Committee.

22 (Whereupon, the hearing in this
23 matter was concluded at 3:20 p.m.)
24

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
)
COUNTY OF C O O K)

I, ANNE I. MAZIORKA, CERT, a Notary Public
within and for the County of Cook and State of Illinois
do hereby certify:


That the foregoing transcript was reported to
me by electronic recording, was thereafter reduced to
typewriting under my personal direction and constitutes a
true record of the testimony given;


That the said hearing was taken before me at
the time and place specified;

That the hearing was adjourned as stated
herein;

That I am not a relative or employee or
attorney or counsel, not a relative or employee of such
attorney or counsel for any of the parties hereto, not
interested directly or indirectly in the outcome of this
action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I do hereunto set my hand
and affix my seal of office at Chicago, Illinois, this 11th
day of June, 1999.




ANNE I. MAZIORKA, CERT
Notary Public, Cook County, IL

CERT NO. 00140